The founders were also remarkable for their innovative commercial strategies and their global outward-looking attitude: most of the subsidiaries and the commercial network were set up between the 1920s and the 1940s. The great expansion of their company took place during these very difficult years, with products adapted to the scarcity and low purchasing power of the times, and with a relatively simple organizational structure (rapid creation of commercial subsidiaries under control of managers linked to them through trust-based agreements).
Andrómaco is interesting for these reasons, but also because it was the first Spanish pharmaceutical company that dared to open a subsidiary at the heart of the global pharmaceutical industry market, the United States, in 1928. Not many companies in developing economies, particularly in science-based industries, dare to sell anything in the markets where global innovation takes place and the major industry players are located.
Academic international business models often indicate that companies in developing economies usually develop through a gradual process where they first learn and transfer knowledge on international operations from developed economies and leading corporations in an industry using different mechanisms, including imports and business trips. According to these gradual academic models of internationalization, a second step for these kinds of companies is to try to export to psychologically similar markets to reduce uncertainty and risk. And in the final stage they may, or may not, try to export and invest in more difficult markets, but rarely the most developed and regulated markets where the toughest competitors in the world are located. Andrómaco is one of the cases that challenge the academic models. developments, but the fact is that the lab's products were made with relatively cheap raw materials, the profit margins were very high, and the employment costs were relatively low.
Rubió Tudurí believed that by outsourcing the production of his nutritional products to US producers, a maquila-style operation, he would certainly save on transportation costs and have good quality production. The quality achieved thanks to the suppliers' US production facilities was much appreciated by Central American clients in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and
Guatemala, who according to Enrique Rubió Boada, Fernando Rubió Tudurí's son, 'loved' buying a US-made Spanish product sold by a Spanish-speaking entrepreneur. Rubió Tudurí was not afraid of the financial crash and probably (though we have no information to back this hypothesis so far) it was perceived as an opportunity to have more US companies ready to serve the Spanish lab at lower prices, as well as to manufacture and to transport the products in US ships to Central America. Barcelona: M Edicions.
